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What’s Really Going On With Pension Reform

Over the years, I have written numerous articles on the looming problem of funding public pensions. Many states are facing severe shortfalls and it isn’t due to the economy or the recent recession or the pandemic. The main problem is accounting gimmicks that cities and states regularly do which results in underreporting their pensions. In the private sector, if someone were to underreport a pension, they go to jail for it, but the public sector gets away with it, and the taxpayer is left holding the bag. 

Here’s what’s going on. A principle of normal (accrual) accounting is that if you have incurred current expenses, they have to be reported currently. You cannot delay reporting it until a future year, even if it is not paid until a future year. You have to count their costs today. So when you accrue an expense — for instance, a legal fee — you owe that money. Even if the bill arrives after the new year and you pay it that next year, you still owe it for the current year when incurred. It is a payable – that is, a liability – as of the end of the year incurred.. This is accrual basis accounting, and it’s how pensions must be accounted for in the public sector — but they’re not. And therein lies the problem.

When an employee works for a government (or any organization) in a given year,  all costs associated with that employment must be recorded as an expense for that year. Naturally, the regular pay iis an expense incurred. That’s an easy enough concept to understand. But there are other things to consider — for instance, a bonus. If you have a bonus that is not paid until the next year, it still has to be recorded in the year it was earned. Now, pensions are not paid out in the year worked or the year after, but they will be years in the future and actuaries can calculate that amount. That amount is not what is booked as an expense. What is booked as an expense is what’s paid. There’s a disconnect between the funding requirement for pensions, and those funding requirements are usually less than the cost incurred.

If that amount is two billion dollars (one billion earned now and one billion in future pension benefits) you are supposed to record two billion dollars. In other words, that liability should be factored in on the balance sheet.  But what’s happening instead is that they’re merely recording the one billion earned by the employee as an expense and not accounting for future payouts. There is no measure of a pension’s accrued actuarial liabilities (the current value of earned benefits in the future). The accountants are merely recording the present expenses while underreporting the future ones.

In a given year, you might incur $100 million in future payments for employees who work. So that $100 million is the true cost. Remember that even though the money is not paid for many years, you still need to know what that cost is today, and include that amount in the budget. You cannot say you’ll ignore it and not include it because you won’t pay it for twenty years. But that is what has been happening. Suffice it to say, in the private sector, it’s very onerous. You have to pay in an amount very close to what the cost is so that the company doesn’t go bankrupt and then leave the pensions hanging. That is both right and responsible. But the morons in the public sector think that because the municipality is so powerful, it doesn’t have to do the funding requirement — and therein lies the reason why they are in trouble. They only put the amount that they pay as an expense; they don’t put the whole thing. That is fraud. So now they’re falling further behind. Even if they don’t have to fund it all, they are required to keep a balanced budget, but they don’t. 

What’s even more difficult, a lot of municipalities also promised other things like future medical expenses, and those aren’t even booked. They’ll just list it as an expense when it is paid. That’s not right. You can’t promise someone a benefit and have a legal obligation for the future and then not book it on your books. And what’s worst of all is a constitutional amendment in several states that grants pension entitlement to public sector workers. In other words, once a person is working for the government and they have a defined benefit plan, they are entitled to keep it and transfer it, even if the contract runs out. They have defined it to pay the pension — not only for what they’ve earned but also include an obligation to continue that level of funding into new contracts, even those that aren’t signed on yet.

These non-standard, non-accrual forms of accounting for public pensions over the past few decades have resulted in reckless — and dare I say criminal — budgets resulting in billions and trillions of unfunded liabilities that in some places are financially insurmountable. Those that have engaged in such practices should be sued criminally for intentionally filing false sheets on their pensions.

What Was Promised and Who Promised It


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Pension reform needs to begin in the public sector. it is clear that a wide gulf between funding and compensation exists. When pointing out the fact that the majority of federal and state public employees are overcompensated, the response is typically that “these amounts were promised”. But with most budgets now currently running severely in the red, addressing the compensation question is the key to solving major deficit dilemmas across the country. We need to analyze how we got here from two perspectives: 1) what was promised and 2) who promised it.

For localities that want to achieve solvency, it is essential to find out foremost exactly what was really and contractually promised to the public workers and for how long. An executive or union member works under a contract that exists for a specific time period. Their obligation is to provide their services in return for certain compensation and benefits during that time. But that’s it — they are only covered for the period of the current contract.

This point is important because there really can be no part of a negotiated contract that promises any compensation or benefits for services rendered after the end of the contract period; otherwise, the locality runs the risk of runaway financial obligations for which it cannot properly budget and it was not binding future governments not yet in office.

Therefore, if accruals to a defined benefit retirement program to a public service employee have been contracted for, the benefit accruals earned by that employee during the period of the contract can’t be taken away. However, unless a new contract specifically continues that same program into that next contract, the employee should not be entitled to any additional accruals.

Unfortunately, it is apparent that this simple concept has typically not been followed during the vast majority of contract negotiations in the public sector. If it had, negotiators for management would have long discontinued offering the out-of-control defined benefit plan.

Such dereliction is part of the reason that it’s necessary to examine the second point – “who promised it”.  It is evident that serious research needs to be done in localities into who it was that negotiated such overgenerous contracts. Ultimately, negotiators have a fiduciary responsibility to the taxpayer not to pay more than fair compensation, thereby restricting compensation and benefits to amounts no greater than what those skills would command in the private sector. Valuable (and expensive) benefits such as job security must be factored in as an element of compensation paid to public sector employees.

Contrast how negotiations are performed in the private sector. The profit motive there keeps compensation at levels where economic forces show to be appropriate (i.e., the point where people generate results that justify its cost). This reflects economically rational “fair” compensation levels. But because the public sector does not have these economic forces to keep compensation levels in check, it is incumbent upon the public negotiators to do so properly. Failing to properly negotiate has created the soaring budget deficits we are experiencing.

There truly is a fundamental difference between private sector “management” and those doing the negotiating in the public sectors. In the private sector, the negotiator — either personally or the company who pays their merit based salary — will suffer serious financial damage if they offer their work force too much, because they will be unable to compete with their competitors in the marketplace.

On the other hand, there are no such competitive inhibitions in the public sector and therefore the negotiation routine lacks the incentive for restraint. Even worse, in most cases, the self-interest of the public sector negotiator is more directly aligned with the union that can get him elected rather than the taxpayer whom he is representing. This is a true case of the fox in charge of the hen house.

Examining the contract process in the public sector will provide an opportunity for fiscal reform. This will ensure that no public sector worker be paid more in any new contract then what those services warrant, without regard to what the prior contract provided. Most importantly, once a contract ends there is nothing on the table. There is nothing to prevent any new contract from offering less that the prior contract, especially where pay and benefits of the prior contract were out of line.

Even though it may be politically difficult and unpalatable, anybody representing the taxpayers has an obligation to those taxpayers. Those who breached the public trust with mismanagement should be held accountable. Budget reform and deficit reduction will naturally follow once compensation levels have been stabilized and brought in line with their private counterparts.