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Striking Workers, Striking Policy

It may not be well known, but in New York, strikers – like the Verizon ones – are able to collect unemployment insurance while striking.It’s about time we expose the audacity of union employees collecting benefits during their time of voluntary unemployment.  It is unconscionable that pro-union policies allow their members to deplete the state unemployment coffers into which hard working employers contribute for their employees. The present job environment is quite disparaging. With 9.2% unemployment and people desperate for work,  unemployment insurance funds are already running at empty. That workers with jobs (like Verizon) are exhausting it further by claiming funds when they have elected to not work is despicable. Viewing this practice in tough economic times like these lets one see how truly outrageous it is. This policy must be reversed.

Duncan Hunter Misses It On Missing Businesses

In an Op-Ed to the Washington Times last week (Stop Exporting American Jobs 8/23/11) Rep. Duncan Hunter assiduously notes that very little is being said about jobs moving overseas but he fails to point out the obvious reason why: our government policies are the driving force behind the mass exodus of businesses abroad. A staggering increase in regulations coupled with the the highest corporate tax rate among industrial nations form the foundation of a very anti-business climate in our current administration.

Hunter goes on to suggest that companies are being offered incentives to move overseas, but the reality is that as the government continues to meddle in business affairs, it creates more disincentives to stay here. High taxes, legislation such as Dodd-Frank, and entities such as the EPA, SEC and the NLRB contribute to the rising cost of doing business here. For many companies, moving abroad is a matter of corporate survival.

Mr. Hunter calls for putting American workers first instead of sending them away. For those legislators who insist that government is the solution – instead of recognizing that it is the problem – maybe it is time to send them away. If Congress, of which Hunter is an elected member, did its job putting American workers first by sticking to the Constitution and staying out of the free-market, perhaps our businesses would once again have the liberty to grow and thrive in our great nation.

Downgraded


The S&P has downgraded our rating to AA+. Here is their press release, reprinted below in its entirety.

 

TORONTO (Standard & Poor’s) Aug. 5, 2011–Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services said today that it lowered its long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States of America to ‘AA+’ from ‘AAA’. Standard & Poor’s also said that the outlook on the long-term rating is negative. At the same time, Standard & Poor’s affirmed its ‘A-1+’ short-term rating on the U.S. In addition, Standard & Poor’s removed both ratings from CreditWatch, where they were placed on July 14, 2011, with negative implications.

The transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment of the U.S.–our assessment of the likelihood of official interference in the ability of U.S.-based public- and private-sector issuers to secure foreign exchange for debt service–remains ‘AAA’.

We lowered our long-term rating on the U.S. because we believe that the prolonged controversy over raising the statutory debt ceiling and the related fiscal policy debate indicate that further near-term progress containing the growth in public spending, especially on entitlements, or on reaching an agreement on raising revenues is less likely than we previously assumed and will remain a contentious and fitful process. We also believe that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration agreed to this week falls short of the amount that we believe is necessary to stabilize the general government debt burden by the middle of the decade.

Our lowering of the rating was prompted by our view on the rising public debt burden and our perception of greater policymaking uncertainty, consistent with our criteria (see “Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and Assumptions,” June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41). Nevertheless, we view the U.S. federal government’s other economic, external, and monetary credit attributes, which form the basis for the sovereign rating, as broadly unchanged.

We have taken the ratings off CreditWatch because the Aug. 2 passage of the Budget Control Act Amendment of 2011 has removed any perceived immediate threat of payment default posed by delays to raising the government’s debt ceiling. In addition, we believe that the act provides sufficient clarity to allow us to evaluate the likely course of U.S. fiscal policy for the next few years.

The political brinksmanship of recent months highlights what we see as America’s governance and policymaking becoming less stable, less effective, and less predictable than what we previously believed. The statutory debt ceiling and the threat of default have become political bargaining chips in the debate over fiscal policy. Despite this year’s wide-ranging debate, in our view, the differences between political parties have proven to be extraordinarily difficult to bridge, and, as we see it, the resulting agreement fell well short of the comprehensive fiscal consolidation program that some proponents had envisaged until quite recently. Republicans and Democrats have only been able to agree to relatively modest savings on discretionary spending while delegating to the Select Committee decisions on more comprehensive measures. It appears that for now, new revenues have dropped down on the menu of policy options. In addition, the plan envisions only minor policy changes on Medicare and little change in other entitlements, the containment of which we and most other independent observers regard as key to long-term fiscal sustainability.

Our opinion is that elected officials remain wary of tackling the structural issues required to effectively address the rising U.S. public debt burden in a manner consistent with a ‘AAA’ rating and with ‘AAA’ rated sovereign peers (see Sovereign Government Rating Methodology and Assumptions,” June 30, 2011, especially Paragraphs 36-41). In our view, the difficulty in framing a consensus on fiscal policy weakens the government’s ability to manage public finances and diverts attention from the debate over how to achieve more balanced and dynamic economic growth in an era of fiscal stringency and private-sector deleveraging (ibid). A new political consensus might (or might not) emerge after the 2012 elections, but we believe that by then, the government debt burden will likely be higher, the needed medium-term fiscal adjustment potentially greater, and the inflection point on the U.S. population’s demographics and other age-related spending drivers closer at hand (see “Global Aging 2011: In The U.S., Going Gray Will Likely Cost Even More Green, Now,” June 21, 2011).

Standard & Poor’s takes no position on the mix of spending and revenue measures that Congress and the Administration might conclude is appropriate for putting the U.S.’s finances on a sustainable footing.

The act calls for as much as $2.4 trillion of reductions in expenditure growth over the 10 years through 2021. These cuts will be implemented in two steps: the $917 billion agreed to initially, followed by an additional $1.5 trillion that the newly formed Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction is supposed to recommend by November 2011. The act contains no measures to raise taxes or otherwise enhance revenues, though the committee could recommend them.

The act further provides that if Congress does not enact the committee’s recommendations, cuts of $1.2 trillion will be implemented over the same time period. The reductions would mainly affect outlays for civilian discretionary spending, defense, and Medicare. We understand that this fall-back mechanism is designed to encourage Congress to embrace a more balanced mix of expenditure savings, as the committee might recommend.

We note that in a letter to Congress on Aug. 1, 2011, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated total budgetary savings under the act to be at least $2.1 trillion over the next 10 years relative to its baseline assumptions. In updating our own fiscal projections, with certain modifications outlined below, we have relied on the CBO’s latest “Alternate Fiscal Scenario” of June 2011, updated to include the CBO assumptions contained in its Aug. 1 letter to Congress. In general, the CBO’s “Alternate Fiscal Scenario” assumes a continuation of recent Congressional action overriding existing law.

We view the act’s measures as a step toward fiscal consolidation. However, this is within the framework of a legislative mechanism that leaves open the details of what is finally agreed to until the end of 2011, and Congress and the Administration could modify any agreement in the future. Even assuming that at least $2.1 trillion of the spending reductions the act envisages are implemented, we maintain our view that the U.S. net general government debt burden (all levels of government combined, excluding liquid financial assets) will likely continue to grow. Under our revised base case fiscal scenario–which we consider to be consistent with a ‘AA+’ long-term rating and a negative outlook–we now project that net general government debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 79% in 2015 and 85% by 2021. Even the projected 2015 ratio of sovereign indebtedness is high in relation to those of peer credits and, as noted, would continue to rise under the act’s revised policy settings.

Compared with previous projections, our revised base case scenario now assumes that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, due to expire by the end of 2012, remain in place. We have changed our assumption on this because the majority of Republicans in Congress continue to resist any measure that would raise revenues, a position we believe Congress reinforced by passing the act. Key macroeconomic assumptions in the base case scenario include trend real GDP growth of 3% and consumer price inflation near 2% annually over the decade.

Our revised upside scenario–which, other things being equal, we view as consistent with the outlook on the ‘AA+’ long-term rating being revised to stable–retains these same macroeconomic assumptions. In addition, it incorporates $950 billion of new revenues on the assumption that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners lapse from 2013 onwards, as the Administration is advocating. In this scenario, we project that the net general government debt would rise from an estimated 74% of GDP by the end of 2011 to 77% in 2015 and to 78% by 2021.

Our revised downside scenario–which, other things being equal, we view as being consistent with a possible further downgrade to a ‘AA’ long-term rating–features less-favorable macroeconomic assumptions, as outlined below and also assumes that the second round of spending cuts (at least $1.2 trillion) that the act calls for does not occur. This scenario also assumes somewhat higher nominal interest rates for U.S. Treasuries. We still believe that the role of the U.S. dollar as the key reserve currency confers a government funding advantage, one that could change only slowly over time, and that Fed policy might lean toward continued loose monetary policy at a time of fiscal tightening. Nonetheless, it is possible that interest rates could rise if investors re-price relative risks. As a result, our alternate scenario factors in a 50 basis point (bp)-75 bp rise in 10-year bond yields relative to the base and upside cases from 2013 onwards. In this scenario, we project the net public debt burden would rise from 74% of GDP in 2011 to 90% in 2015 and to 101% by 2021.

Our revised scenarios also take into account the significant negative revisions to historical GDP data that the Bureau of Economic Analysis announced on July 29. From our perspective, the effect of these revisions underscores two related points when evaluating the likely debt trajectory of the U.S. government. First, the revisions show that the recent recession was deeper than previously assumed, so the GDP this year is lower than previously thought in both nominal and real terms. Consequently, the debt burden is slightly higher. Second, the revised data highlight the sub-par path of the current economic recovery when compared with rebounds following previous post-war recessions. We believe the sluggish pace of the current economic recovery could be consistent with the experiences of countries that have had financial crises in which the slow process of debt deleveraging in the private sector leads to a persistent drag on demand. As a result, our downside case scenario assumes relatively modest real trend GDP growth of 2.5% and inflation of near 1.5% annually going forward.

When comparing the U.S. to sovereigns with ‘AAA’ long-term ratings that we view as relevant peers–Canada, France, Germany, and the U.K.–we also observe, based on our base case scenarios for each, that the trajectory of the U.S.’s net public debt is diverging from the others. Including the U.S., we estimate that these five sovereigns will have net general government debt to GDP ratios this year ranging from 34% (Canada) to 80% (the U.K.), with the U.S. debt burden at 74%. By 2015, we project that their net public debt to GDP ratios will range between 30% (lowest, Canada) and 83% (highest, France), with the U.S. debt burden at 79%. However, in contrast with the U.S., we project that the net public debt burdens of these other sovereigns will begin to decline, either before or by 2015.

Standard & Poor’s transfer T&C assessment of the U.S. remains ‘AAA’. Our T&C assessment reflects our view of the likelihood of the sovereign restricting other public and private issuers’ access to foreign exchange needed to meet debt service. Although in our view the credit standing of the U.S. government has deteriorated modestly, we see little indication that official interference of this kind is entering onto the policy agenda of either Congress or the Administration. Consequently, we continue to view this risk as being highly remote.

The outlook on the long-term rating is negative. As our downside alternate fiscal scenario illustrates, a higher public debt trajectory than we currently assume could lead us to lower the long-term rating again. On the other hand, as our upside scenario highlights, if the recommendations of the Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction–independently or coupled with other initiatives, such as the lapsing of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for high earners–lead to fiscal consolidation measures beyond the minimum mandated, and we believe they are likely to slow the deterioration of the government’s debt dynamics, the long-term rating could stabilize at ‘AA+’.

On Monday, we will issue separate releases concerning affected ratings in the funds, government-related entities, financial institutions, insurance, public finance, and structured finance sectors.

Pay Czars And Public Service

Have we forgotten about the Pay Czar? Ken Feinburg’s activity during the early part of the Obama administration certainly had some troubling components. Chief among these was the basic fact that this “pay czar”, as he was dubbed, was technically acting independently of any authority in this role. Dana Milbank aptly pointed out that,“he was neither confirmed by Congress nor accountable to President Obama”. And even after he was replaced, no one has still answered the question —  who does the Pay Czar answer to?

Equally disturbing is the fact that the Pay Czar makes unilateral decisions about the compensation of private businesses — something that is certainly not within the realm of the government’s constitutional authority.  Yet Obama’s rationale for delving brazenly into the private sector remains largely undiscussed in any substantive media outlet.

The role of the Pay Czar, according to Obama, is to have the government beat up and chop up the (large) compensation practices of the companies whom the government bails out, under the guise of fairness and necessity. In truth, the companies have almost all paid the bailouts back and it hasn’t cost the government too many millions except, perhaps, with AIG who hasn’t returned all of their funds. Nonetheless, we were told it was essential to have this agent put in place to handle this dire problem.

This begs the question: if the government is so intent on bullying the compensation of those “overpaid” for their services, why then are they not doing the same for the public sector?  Now there’s a real place which could stand more than a mere trimming. Such cuts, in the form of reduced compensation and decreased pension plans, would serve to keep our government and public service unions at least a little less bloated.

Certainly, if the Obama administration were to follow its self-avowed principle to scale back organizations that are overcompensated, they should look no further than the government itself. Considering our staggering deficit situation, as stewards of the taxpayer’s money, the public arena should be — must be — drastically reduced to be in line with the private service sector.

Attacking The Wealthy Attacks Our Economy


As the deficit talks ensue, Obama continues to blather on about eliminating tax cuts for the wealthy. In fact, this is shaping up to be a major theme of his reelection campaign as well. Thankfully for the Republicans, this position serves to highlight his continued economic incompetence.

As a practicing CPA for nearly forty years, my clients are mainly those that fall under the category of “wealthy”. They may make the most money,  but they are assuredly the ones paying the most taxes. These people in the highest tax bracket basically fall into three categories:  1) Small business owners (200-2000 employees); 2) Executives working for a company; and 3) Wealthy individuals by inheritance or investment. Allowing the tax rate to rise affects each of these groups differently, but the economy and its recovery will be stymied nonetheless.

With the first group, most small business owners are arranged as an Scorp or LLC, which means they pay tax rates at the individual level, not business. Raising the rate to 39.6% raises the rate on these businesses. Most of the money made by these owners is reinvested in their company. They basically take out enough income on which to live and anything more gets put back into their business. So, if you increase their taxes, there is less money to reinvest in their company and back into the economy. This is an important point because spending money as a means of coaxing a recovery is much, much less effective and stimulative than any investment is.

Regarding the second group, most executives working for a company enjoy a large salary; however, much of that salary is fueled by stock options which make their taxes larger. Quite typically, the proceeds of that income is returned the company via more stock, which funnels growth, or cash is reinvested as needed. An increase in taxes will decrease their ability to best allocate their business returns.

Although the third group of individuals often have a lifestyle that is inherited, more money that is taxed out of that lifestyle means there is less to invest in appropriate economic endeavors – i.e. hedge funds, equities, and high risk funds. Those very investments are responsible for an enormous amount of the entrepreneurship in this country. Taking away available capital via tax increases reduces innovation in the economy.

In a time of a recession unprecedented since the Great Depression, economic improvement is crucial. Inflicting tax increases on the segment of the population most able to invest in our economy and businesses will only slow our sluggish recovery. Trying to punish the taxpayers for the sake of campaign sound bites and political gain is both reprehensible and repugnant.