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What’s Really Going On With Pension Reform

Over the years, I have written numerous articles on the looming problem of funding public pensions. Many states are facing severe shortfalls and it isn’t due to the economy or the recent recession or the pandemic. The main problem is accounting gimmicks that cities and states regularly do which results in underreporting their pensions. In the private sector, if someone were to underreport a pension, they go to jail for it, but the public sector gets away with it, and the taxpayer is left holding the bag. 

Here’s what’s going on. A principle of normal (accrual) accounting is that if you have incurred current expenses, they have to be reported currently. You cannot delay reporting it until a future year, even if it is not paid until a future year. You have to count their costs today. So when you accrue an expense — for instance, a legal fee — you owe that money. Even if the bill arrives after the new year and you pay it that next year, you still owe it for the current year when incurred. It is a payable – that is, a liability – as of the end of the year incurred.. This is accrual basis accounting, and it’s how pensions must be accounted for in the public sector — but they’re not. And therein lies the problem.

When an employee works for a government (or any organization) in a given year,  all costs associated with that employment must be recorded as an expense for that year. Naturally, the regular pay iis an expense incurred. That’s an easy enough concept to understand. But there are other things to consider — for instance, a bonus. If you have a bonus that is not paid until the next year, it still has to be recorded in the year it was earned. Now, pensions are not paid out in the year worked or the year after, but they will be years in the future and actuaries can calculate that amount. That amount is not what is booked as an expense. What is booked as an expense is what’s paid. There’s a disconnect between the funding requirement for pensions, and those funding requirements are usually less than the cost incurred.

If that amount is two billion dollars (one billion earned now and one billion in future pension benefits) you are supposed to record two billion dollars. In other words, that liability should be factored in on the balance sheet.  But what’s happening instead is that they’re merely recording the one billion earned by the employee as an expense and not accounting for future payouts. There is no measure of a pension’s accrued actuarial liabilities (the current value of earned benefits in the future). The accountants are merely recording the present expenses while underreporting the future ones.

In a given year, you might incur $100 million in future payments for employees who work. So that $100 million is the true cost. Remember that even though the money is not paid for many years, you still need to know what that cost is today, and include that amount in the budget. You cannot say you’ll ignore it and not include it because you won’t pay it for twenty years. But that is what has been happening. Suffice it to say, in the private sector, it’s very onerous. You have to pay in an amount very close to what the cost is so that the company doesn’t go bankrupt and then leave the pensions hanging. That is both right and responsible. But the morons in the public sector think that because the municipality is so powerful, it doesn’t have to do the funding requirement — and therein lies the reason why they are in trouble. They only put the amount that they pay as an expense; they don’t put the whole thing. That is fraud. So now they’re falling further behind. Even if they don’t have to fund it all, they are required to keep a balanced budget, but they don’t. 

What’s even more difficult, a lot of municipalities also promised other things like future medical expenses, and those aren’t even booked. They’ll just list it as an expense when it is paid. That’s not right. You can’t promise someone a benefit and have a legal obligation for the future and then not book it on your books. And what’s worst of all is a constitutional amendment in several states that grants pension entitlement to public sector workers. In other words, once a person is working for the government and they have a defined benefit plan, they are entitled to keep it and transfer it, even if the contract runs out. They have defined it to pay the pension — not only for what they’ve earned but also include an obligation to continue that level of funding into new contracts, even those that aren’t signed on yet.

These non-standard, non-accrual forms of accounting for public pensions over the past few decades have resulted in reckless — and dare I say criminal — budgets resulting in billions and trillions of unfunded liabilities that in some places are financially insurmountable. Those that have engaged in such practices should be sued criminally for intentionally filing false sheets on their pensions.

More Thoughts on the Pension Crisis

Forbes has published a continuation of John Mauldin’s essay from September 16. He reiterates that “the coming pension and unfunded government liabilities storm is so big that many of us simply can’t get out of the way, at least not without great difficulty. This holds true not just for the U.S. but for almost all of the developed world.”  Read his essay below:

Getting back to the topic, we’re all trapped on small, vulnerable islands. Multiple storms are coming, and evacuation is not an option. All we can do is prepare and then ride them out.

And we all have some very important choices to make.

It Will Be Every Man for Himself

Although I’m known far and wide as “the Muddle Through Guy,” the state and local pension crisis is one that we can’t just muddle through. It’s a solid wall that we’re going to run smack into.

Police officers, firefighters, teachers and other public workers who expect to receive the promised retirement benefits will be bitterly turned down. And the taxpayers will complain vigorously if their taxes are raised beyond all reason.

Pleasing both those groups is not going to be possible in this universe.

So what will happen?

It’s impossible to say, just as we don’t know in advance where a hurricane will make landfall: We just know enough to say the storm will be bad for whoever is caught in its path. But here’s the twist: This financial storm won’t just strike those who live on the economic margins; all of us supposedly well-protected “inland” folk are vulnerable, too.

The damage won’t be random, but neither will it be orderly or logical or just. It will be a mess.

Some who made terrible decisions will come out fine. Others who did everything right will sustain severe hits. The people we ought to blame will be long out of office. Lacking scapegoats, people will invent some.

Worse, it will be a local mess.

Imagine local elections that pit police officers and teachers against once-wealthy homeowners whose property values are plummeting. All will want maximum protection for themselves, at minimum risk and cost.

They can’t all win. Compromises will be the only solution—but reaching those unhappy compromises will be unbelievably ugly. In the next few paragraphs I will illustrate the enormity of the situation with a few more details, some of which were supplied this week by readers.

The Problem Is Reaching a Critical Point

Let’s look at a few more hard facts. Pension costs already consume more than 15% of some big-city budgets, and they will be a much larger percentage in the future. That liability crowds out development and infrastructure improvement, not to mention basic services. It forces city leaders to raise taxes and impose “fees.” Let me quote from the always informative 13d letter (their emphasis):

Consider the City of Los Angeles, which Paul Hatfield, writing for City Watch L.A., recently characterized as being in a state of “virtual bankruptcy.” After a period of stability going back to 2010, violent crime grew 38% over the two-year period ending in December 2016. Citywide robberies have increased 14% since 2015. One possible reason for this uptick: the city’s population has grown while its police department has shrunk. As Hatfield explains:

The LAPD ranks have fallen below the 10,000 achieved in 2013. But the city requires a force of 12,500 to perform effectively… A key factor which limits how much can be budgeted for police services is the city’s share of pensions costs. They consume 20% of the general fund budget, up from 5% in 2002… It is difficult to increase the level of service while lugging that much baggage.

What about subway service in New York City? The system is fraying under record ridership, and trains are breaking down more frequently. There are now more than 70,000 delays every month, up from about 28,000 per month five years ago. The city’s soaring pension costs are a big factor here as well. According to a Manhattan Institute report by E.J. McMahon and Josh McGee issued in July, the city is spending over 11% of its budget on pensions. This means that since 2014, New York City has spent more on pensions that it has building and repairing schools, parks, bridges and subways, combined.

There are many large, older cities where there are more police and teachers on the pension payroll than are now working for the city. That problem is compounding, as those workers will live longer, and the pensioners typically have inflation and other escalation clauses to keep their benefits going up.

Further, most cities do not account for increases in healthcare costs (unfunded liabilities) that they will face in addition to the pensions. Candidly, this is just another “a trillion here, a trillion there” problem. Except for the fact that the trillion dollars must be dug out of state and local budgets that total only $2.5 trillion in aggregate.

Now, add in the near certainty of a recession within the next five years  (and I really think sooner) and the ongoing gridlock in national politics, plus the assorted other challenges and crises we face. I won’t run down the full list—you know it well.

I just have to wonder, what are we going to do?

US Pension System Woes

The Financial Times reviewed data recently that suggested that the US public pension system is in dire straits; the funding shortage is likely 3 times as large as what is being reported. The estimated deficit is $3.4 trillion.

The solutions for the funding shortfalls are grim: either raise taxes or cut spending; unfortunately the “cut spending” approach always goes to the essential services first, so that taxpayers feel the heat and will consider a tax hike instead.

US Congressman Devin Nunes recently noted that, “It has been clear for years that many cities and states are critically underfunding their pension programmes and hiding the fiscal holes with accounting tricks.” Nunes has “put forward a bill to the House of Representatives last month to overhaul how public pension plans report their figures.” He added: “When these pension funds go insolvent, they will create problems so disastrous that the fund officials assume the federal government will have to bail them out.”

Insolvency has already been observed in San Bernardino, California and Detroit, Michigan, largely due to mismanagement of pension funding and budget shortfalls. The Financial Times noted that “Chicago, Dallas, Houston and El Paso have the largest pension holes compared with their own revenues”, as well as the states of Illinois, Arizona, Ohio, and Nevada.

Research done by Stanford paints a difficult future: “Currently, states and local governments contribute 7.3 per cent of revenues to public pension plans, but this would need to increase to an average of 17.5 per cent of revenues to stop any further rises in the funding gap.”

And more: “Several cities and states, including California, Illinois, New Jersey, Chicago and Austin, would need to put at least 20 per cent of their revenues into their pension plans to prevent a rise in their deficits, while Nevada would have to contribute almost 40 per cent.”

Much of the problem lies in the fact that retirement costs and liabilities have consistently been calculated on a 7%-8% return , which is not particularly realistic, as has been demonstrated in recent years during the economic downturn.

There is no way this silent funding crisis will get any better — and until localities recognize and admit their crisis and make ardent changes to their pension systems, it will only continue to worsen egregiously.

Pension Fund Crisis Ballooning in Major Cities

Bloomberg did a feature this week on the long-term outlook on pension funds for several major cities, and found that it is swiftly becoming a fiscal tsunami in several places. Part of this stems from severe under-funding of pension plans over many years, while the other part is accounting tricks.

As Bloomberg notes, “Moody’s, which in 2013 began using a lower rate than governments do to calculate future liabilities, has estimated that the 25 largest U.S. public pensions alone have $2 trillion less than they need.” This rate gimmick ultimately hides the true cost of retirement liabilities in municipalities. Additionally, “officials have been able to lower the size of the liability by counting on investment earnings of more than 7 percent a year, even after they expect to run out of cash. New rules from the Governmental Accounting Standards Board require a lower rate to be used after retirement plans go broke. Many reported shortfalls will grow as a result.”

Already, many U.S. cities each face billions in costs, resulting in trillions of dollars in municipal-bond market deficit. By now, many places have been downgraded — even down to junk — and thus face higher yield demands from investors.

For example:

Cincinnati and Minneapolis have already been lowered. Chicago was already downgraded to junk this past May as a result of a $20 billion pension deficit, and “was forced to pay yields of almost 8 percent on taxable bonds maturing in 2042, about twice what some homeowners can get on a 30-year mortgage.”

Houston was put on notice in early July by Moody’s that their bond rating was lowered to “negative” due to unfunded pensions costs. Houston’s revenue faces limitations from property tax caps, and thus funding the pension promises properly for three pension systems at this point has become increasingly difficult. It faces an unfunded liability of about $3.4 billion.

Likewise, in Dallas, the firefighters and police pension system deficit is poised to triple its shortfall “to $4.7 billion because of the accounting-rule shift.”

Perhaps the most egregious example is the California Public Employees’ Retirement System, the biggest pension system in the United States. They reported this week that “it earned just 2.4 percent last fiscal year, one-third of the annual return it projects. The California State Teachers’ Retirement System, the second-biggest fund, gained 4.5 percent, compared with its 7.5 percent goal.” Years of over-generous promises have resulted in an enormous and unsustainable debt that ultimately taxpayer will have to foot the bill for.

When the public sector and unions signed off on lavish pension provisions for the employee, they hoped there would be enough growth and investment returns to cover it way down the road. There were no provisions made to handle the possibility of a low-interest rate society or a fledgling economy like we’ve experienced the last six years; they took their chances and their fallback was always that they could suck money from the taxpayer by raising taxes to cover budgeting shortfalls. That is reckless and irresponsible.

Years of fiscal mismanagement in the public sector has resulted in this fiscal nightmare. Because the public sector does not have the economic forces of competition to keep compensation levels in check, as the public sector does, it was always incumbent upon public negotiators to manage contracts properly. Failing to properly negotiate, making cozy deals, and maintaining unsustainable defined-benefit plans has created the soaring budget and pension deficits we are experiencing.

And its only going to get worse.

How To Solve Detroit’s Pension System Problem In One Easy Step


The NY Post had a good piece today by William McGurn on the state of the union (pension system) in Detroit, making the case for Detroit to switch to defined contribution plans for their union workers. McGurn is right on the mark that the such a move is critical for the city’s revitalization. Dispensing with this one particularly enormous financial burden which has added greatly to the city’s fiscal insolvency would change the city’s finances for the better going forward. However, he seems skeptical that such a radical change could ever be achieved.

There is a way to implement a change to a defined contribution system. Even though the city of Detroit is billions of dollars in debt, the emergency manager, Kevyn Orr, has the opportunity to make to make it happen.

Orr is currently at odds with the unions over the total amount that union’s two pension system are underfunded. Using the actuarial projections provided by the unions, the funds are only short by $650 million, while Orr’s calculations show that the underfunding is a good $3.5 billion. Who is right? Orr believes he is correct and some independent studies seem to back his assertions. In actuality, it doesn’t necessarily matter who is correct, because the conflict actually provides a solution for the city.

If the unions wish to argue that their pension liability is merely $650 million, the city should wholeheartedly agree to fully fund their request — with one important condition. The unions must either a) agree to a fixed annual contribution to the defined benefit plans going forward, or b) (the better solution) cease using a defined benefit plan and move to a defined contribution plan going forward for all of their employees. In either case they must take full ownership, responsibility, and management, from here on out.

Once the unions pensions are fully paid up with the $650 million from the city, they will be in a position to take over the management of their funds. Let the unions use their expertise and earn the 8% that they maintain should be readily achievable. If they can do it, their members will continue to thrive-as-usual, ultimately collecting the pensions that have been promised to them for work up to this point. If they can only earn 3-4 or 6%, it will be on them to explain to their own members why their numbers are suddenly now off.

Even though $650 million sounds like a large number to pay off and fully fund the union pensions, it is a small amount to pay for the fiduciary freedom that comes with not having to manage an incredibly complex, risky, and fiscally unsound system. Such a move will contribute greatly to the long term health of the city of Detroit.